基于演化博弈的地方政府环境规制策略分析  

Analysis on environmental regulation strategy of local government based on evolutionary game theory

作　　者：潘峰[1] 西宝[2] 王琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,哈尔滨150001 [2]大连理工大学公共管理与法学学院,大连116024

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第6期1393-1404,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AGL010);国家自然科学基金(61074133)

摘　　要：针对我国环境规制政策的执行,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府、排污企业以及中央政府的决策演化过程,建立了地方政府与排污企业、地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略,分析了地方政府环境规制策略的影响因素.研究结果表明,地方政府政绩考核体系中环境质量指标的权重系数与经济发展指标的权重系数、环境规制执行成本、中央政府对地方政府的处罚额、排污收费费率、排污企业的治污成本与污染物削减量,都会对地方政府的环境规制策略产生影响.最后,为促进地方政府环境规制的严格执行提出了政策建议.For the implementation of environmental regulation in China,evolutionary process of decision among local government,enterprise and central government from the perspective of evolutionary game theory is discussed.The evolutionary game model between local government and enterprise is established,and the evolutionary game model between local government and central government as well.Behavioral evolutionary law and evolutionarily stable strategies are given according to replicator dynamics equation.The influencing factors of environmental regulation strategy of local government are analyzed.The results show that the environmental regulation strategy of the local government is affected by the weight coefficient of environmental quality index and economic development index in achievement assessment system,the cost of implementation of environmental regulation,the punishment of central government to local government,the rate of pollution discharge,the cost and the emission reductions of controlling pollution.Finally some policy suggestions for the implementation of environmental regulation are proposed.

关 键 词：环境规制 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 地方政府 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]