实际控制人性质、控制权转移与盈余管理  

The Nature of Actual Controller,Transfer of Control and Earnings Management

作　　者：唐建新[1] 胡海燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第3期402-408,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：以2003-2011中国A股上市公司数据为样本,研究了公司实际控制人性质、控制权转移对盈余管理的影响。结果发现,当实际控制人为国有属性的时候,公司盈余管理程度更低。当实际控制人性质从国有属性转移至非国有属性时,公司盈余管理程度变得更高。为了克服由于样本选择导致的潜在内生性问题,本文运用倾向性得分倍差法(PSM-DID)进行稳健性检验,研究结论保持一致。最终研究结果表明,国有属性有利于降低盈余管理,提高会计信息的可靠性。This paper studies the nature of actual controllers effect,the transfer of control on earnings management.Using multiple regression analysis, this paper finds that earnings management is lower when the nature of actual controllers is state-owned. When the nature of actual controller transfers from state-owned to non-state-owned, earnings management is higher. Using propensity score matc- hing,combining with the difference in difference methods for robustness test （PSM-DID）,the conclu- sion remains the same.This study confirms that the nature of state-owned can inhibit earnings man- agement and improve the reliability of accounting information.

关 键 词：实际控制人性质 控制权转移 盈余管理 倾向性得分倍差法 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]