产品市场竞争、管理层权力与横向交叉持股——基于我国资本市场的实证研究  

Product Market Competition Managerial Power and Horizontal Cross Shareholding Empirical Evidence from China Stock Market

作　　者：郭葆春[1,2] 黄蝶[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200433 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第6期13-19,27,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102040);国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CGL034)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以2007-2013年我国资本市场中持股同行业公司的上市公司为样本，从产品市场竞争和管理层权力两个维度研究我国上市公司横向交叉持股行为的动因。研究发现：公司上一年度市场份额和管理层权力均与交叉持股行为的发生或维持显著正相关，而当公司市场份额越小时，更会促使管理层运用自身权利进行横向交叉持股，说明我国横向交叉持股行为受到外部产业因素和内部管理层权力的相互共同影响。Taking listed companies which had cross shareholding in other listed companies of the same industry in the Year 2007-2013, this paper empirically explores the causes of horizontal partial ownership arrangement from the respect of market competition and managerial power. The results show that the horizontal partial ownership arrangements are correlated significantly and positively to both the market share and managerial power. Additionally the weaker capability of market competition will encourage the management with stronger power to make the horizontal partial ownership arrangements.

关 键 词：横向交叉持股 产品市场竞争 管理层权力 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]