基于静态贝叶斯博弈的风险评估方法研究  

Risk assessment selection based on static Bayesian game

作　　者：余定坤[1] 王晋东[1] 张恒巍[1] 王娜[1] 陈宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]解放军信息工程大学密码工程学院,河南郑州450000

出　　处：《计算机工程与科学》2015年第6期1079-1086,共8页Computer Engineering & Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61303074;61309013);国家973计划资助项目(2012CB315900)

摘　　要：目前基于博弈论的风险评估方法大多数采用完全信息博弈模型,无法应对攻击者和防御者互不清楚对方行为的情况。基于静态贝叶斯博弈理论建立攻防博弈模型,将攻击者和防御者分为多种类型,全面地分析了博弈的贝叶斯均衡及其存在性,并结合防御者反击行为、攻击成功率对已有的策略收益量化方法进行改进。基于博弈均衡进行攻击行为可信预测,给出了风险评估算法对信息系统所存在的风险进行计算,得到系统风险值。最后,通过一个实例分析验证了模型和算法的有效性。Nowadays,most studies of risk assessment methods based on game theory use complete information game model. These models cannot deal with the situation in which the attacker and the defend- er do not know each other＇s actions. In this paper we establish an attack-defense model based on static Bayesian game theory to categorize the attacker and the defender into different types. Then, we analyze the Bayesian equilibrium of the game comprehensively, and improve the taxonomy and cost quantitative method of the classical strategies with consideration of the strike back acts of the defender and the success rate of attacks. Under the premise that the actions of the attacker are predicted based on game equilibrium, we use the risk calculating algorithm to calculate the risk in the information system. Simulation results prove the effectiveness of the proposed model and the algorithm.

关 键 词：风险评估 静态贝叶斯博弈 收益量化 混合策略 贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]