利益集团影响下的中国贸易保护政策——基于产业分工的视角  

Chinese Trade Policy under Impact of Interest Groups:From Perspective of Industrial Division

作　　者：顾振华[1] 沈瑶[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海大学经济学院,200444

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2015年第2期74-93,共20页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"农产品SPS适度保护水平的形成机理与应用策略研究"(项目编号:71373154)资助

摘　　要：利益集团会对中国政府产生影响吗?利益集团在中国的影响方式又和在西方国家时有何区别?利益集团之间是否也存在竞争关系?本文以"保护待售"模型为基础,考察了利益集团与政府以及利益集团之间的相互影响机制,并且利用2004—2012年中国36个行业数据进行了经验验证。结果表明:我国各行业中确实存在能够影响政府的利益集团,影响方式是代表委员类政治联系;与不存在利益集团的行业相比,拥有利益集团的行业会获得较高贸易保护;若下游行业存在利益集团,则上游行业原先获得的保护会被削弱。中国政府在制定贸易政策时基本兼顾了社会福利和利益集团利益。此外,利益集团的存在有时也会促进经济的发展。Do interest groups really impact the government？ What＇s difference between Chinese-style interest groups and the foreign ones？ Do interest groups compete among themselves？ The paper analyzes the mechanism between interest groups and government and between themselves, with ＂Protection for Sale＂ framework of political trade economics as the foundation. Meanwhile, it uses data of 2004--2012 Chinese 36 industrial sectors to test the results. The results are the following. There are interest groups in many sectors, whose way to impact are delegate-style political connection indeed. The presence of interest groups leads to higher trade barriers in one sector. If interest groups are present in downstream sec- tor, the protection of the upstream one is undermined. Chinese is also sensitive to the politi- cal impact. The presence of interest groups sometimes is not harmful.

关 键 词：利益集团 产业分工 政治联系 代表委员类 

分 类 号：F752.02[经济管理—国际贸易]