基于参与主体异质性条件下囚徒困境合作演化博弈模型研究  

The Cooperative Evolutionary Game Model of Prisoner's Dilemma under Agent Heterogeneity

作　　者：张新立[1] 张恰元 何丽红[1] 董婷婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁师范大学数学学院,辽宁大连116029

出　　处：《经济数学》2015年第2期66-69,共4页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC630395);大连市科技局项目(2013D13ZC186)

摘　　要：利用演化博弈理论,对参与主体异质性条件下的囚徒困境模型进行了探讨,求出了满足不同条件下的演化稳定策略,并对种群中个体异质性对演化稳定策略的影响进行了分析,得出种群中选择相同策略的个体异质性差异越大,参与个体选择合作行为作为演化稳定策略的可能性就越大.极端地,当个体的异质性趋向于无穷大时,合作成为唯一的演化稳定占优策略,为现实大多数合作系统中能保持长期的一种合作稳定状态提供了合理地解释.This paper studied prisoner＇s dilemma model under agent heterogeneity by evolutionary game theory, solved evolutionary stable strategy under different conditions, and analyzed how the agent heterogeneity affects the evolutionary stable strategy. It points out that the cooperative behavior of evolutionary stable strategy will be increased with the addition of the difference of agent heterogeneity. Extremely, cooperation is the unique dominant strategy when the difference of agent hetero- geneity approaches to infinite. It provides reasonable explanation that the most cooperative system can maintain a long-term cooperative stable state in the real world.

关 键 词：博弈论 合作行为 合作演化博弈 囚徒困境 异质性 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学]