基于博弈论的节能量保证型EPC合同决策分析  

Contract Decisions Analysis of Guaranteed Savings Energy Performance Contracting Based on Game Theory

作　　者：徐晓燕[1] 吴焕焕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2015年第3期112-119,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971123)

摘　　要：合同能源管理(EPC)是一种以未来节约的能源费用支付节能项目成本的节能管理机制。节能量保证型EPC模式中,耗能企业负责为项目融资,节能服务公司提供项目的全程服务并向客户企业保证一定的节能效益。若达不到承诺值,节能服务公司向客户进行补偿,若超出承诺值,客户给予节能服务公司一定的奖励。合同决策问题是该模式应用中的重要问题。本文以节能量保证型EPC合同中初始项目投资、合同期限和超额节能效益奖励的决策问题为研究对象,建立了客户和节能服务公司之间的决策博弈模型,分析二者的最优合同决策。数值试验结果表明,该方法不仅能让客户企业和节能服务公司均受益,还可以有效提高项目的投资报酬率,并且较高的节能服务公司技术水平和客户初始耗能水平能产生更高的节能效率。Energy Performance Contracting（EPC）is a kind of energy-saving management mechanism that uses energy costs saved in the future to pay cost of energy-saving project. In guaranteed savings EPC model, energy-consuming clients take the responsibility for project financing, while energy service companies provide a complete set of service for the project and guarantee certain performance to their clients. If the project fails to meet the guaranteed value, the energy service company would pay compensation to the client, otherwise, the client would offer certain reward to the company. A contract parameters decision problem is a basic problem in the application of this model. This paper takes the decision problem of initial project investment, contract period and excess project performance reward in guaranteed savings EPC model as research objectives, establishes a decision-making game model between the client and the energy service company to analyze optimal contract decisions. The results of numerical experiments show that this method can not only benefit both the client enterprises and the energy service companies, but also effectively improve the project return-on-investment rate. And higher energy service companies＇ technology level and the client enterprises＇ initial energy-consuming level would bring higher energy-saving efficiency.

关 键 词：合同能源管理 节能量保证 STACKELBERG博弈 混合整数非线性规划 

分 类 号：F206[经济管理—国民经济]