建筑施工安全监管的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of construction safety supervision

作　　者：谭翀[1] 陆愈实[1] 余庆春[2] 车恒[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国地质大学(武汉)工程学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]湖南科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,湖南湘潭411201 [3]武汉数字工程研究所,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《兰州理工大学学报》2015年第3期145-149,共5页Journal of Lanzhou University of Technology

摘　　要：为找出监管部门与企业在施工过程中的策略选择的演化规律,充分调动双方在安全施工和监管上的积极性,在监管部门与施工企业具有有限理性的前提下,借助演化博弈的理论与方法,构建企业与监管部门在策略选择上的演化博弈模型.通过分析演化模型,揭示双方的不同策略选择对彼此行为的影响.结果表明,双方的策略选择与多种因素密切相关.In order to find out the evaluation pattern of strategy selection of supervision department and construction enterprise in the process of construction and mobilize sufficiently the enthusiasm of both sides for construction safety and its supervision and,meantime,taking account of the limited comprehension at both sides,an evolutionary game model for strategy selection of both sides is constructed with the theory and method of evolutionary game.By analyzing the evolution model,the effect of different strategy selection of both sides on their behavior will be revealed.It is shown by the result that the strategy selection is closely related with various factors.

关 键 词：建筑安全 安全监管 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TU714[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]