基于SD的工程合谋防治演化博弈动态分析  

Dynamic Analysis of Evolutionary Game in Project Collusion Control Based on System Dynamics Model

作　　者：俞乐[1] 周洪涛[1] 曾伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学自动化学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2015年第3期349-353,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71390524)

摘　　要：针对政府重大工程项目合谋腐败现象频频发生,对政府利益和工程质量造成严重危害的问题,为了有效抑制监理方和承包商合谋现象发生,对政府工程项目下政府、监理公司和施工承包商三方演化博弈过程进行了研究。首先在有限理性的条件下引入前进理论建立博弈模型,得到Nash均衡,然后利用演化博弈理论求得不同监理风险态度状况下的演化稳定状态,最后,利用系统动力学软件对演化博弈过程进行仿真,验证稳定策略,并通过仿真得到抑制合谋的主要因素及打击方法,分析并给出了有限理性下打击合谋的监管策略,为打击政府重大工程项目合谋提供参考。Corruption or collusion has frequently occurred in the major government investment projects,which has already brought great harm to the interest of the government and the quality of the projects. In order to effectively restrain collusion which formed by the supervision and the contractor,an evolutionary game model was structured to analyze the collusion in bounded rationality. Firstly,through the model,the Nash equilibrium and the evolutionary equilibrium in different supervision＇s risk attitudes were figured out based on combining prospect theory and evolutionary game theory. Then,a system dynamics model（ SD）was built to prove equilibrium results. The stability analysis and simulation illustrate the ways to control the collusion and prove that SD model and evolutionary game theory can work in controlling collusion for the government use.

关 键 词：工程合谋 演化博弈 风险态度 系统动力学 

分 类 号：N941[自然科学总论—系统科学]