融资融券的治理效应研究——基于会计稳健性的视角  

The Governance Roles of Margin Trading： A Perspective of Accounting Conservatism

作　　者：陈晖丽[1] 刘峰[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]厦门大学管理学院 [3]中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2014年第3期277-294,共18页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“制度变迁、控制权市场与企业价值”(71272079);教育部人文社科基地重大项目“非市场化的控制权转移”(11JJD790032);2012年度笹川优秀青年奖学基金的资助

摘　　要：本文以我国融资融券交易试点为背景,研究融资融券对上市公司会计稳健性的影响。采用双重差分方法,我们发现,对比控制组公司,成为融资融券标的证券后,融资融券公司的会计稳健性显著提高;当公司的股权结构缺乏制衡时,融资融券能够显著提高会计稳健性;对于融资受到约束的公司,融资融券对会计稳健性的促进作用更加明显。这些结果表明,融资融券能够对公司的会计行为产生影响,具有公司治理效应。Based on the pilot margin trading in China, this paper examines how margin trading affects accounting conservatism in listed companies. Using difference-in-differences approach, we find that compared with control firms, companies that are eligible for margin trading significantly increase their accounting conservatism after they are designated as underlying securities. We take into consideration the impact of ownership structure and financial constraints. For companies without balanced ownership structure, or for those that are finan- cial constrained, the improvement in conservatism is significant, but not vice versa. These indicate that margin trading can affect accounting behaviors and plays a role in corporate governance.

关 键 词：融资融券 会计稳健性 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F830.42