社保基金持股偏好与治理效果的实证分析——基于股东积极主义的视角  

An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Fund Ownership Preference and Governance Effect：Based on the Perspective of Shareholder Activism

作　　者：何丹[1] 何玉霞[1] 高上雅 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2014年第3期295-312,共18页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家社科基金项目“投资者法律保护与所有权结构关系研究”(10CJY007);“中央高校基本科研业务费”(JBK130127)的资助

摘　　要：采用2003—2012年A股市场上市公司为样本,研究社保基金持股偏好、治理路径与治理效果。研究结果发现,社保基金倾向于选择高现金股利分配和股权集中度低的公司进行投资。社保基金通过监督公司管理层和大股东,有效改善了公司治理结构,提高了治理效率。就治理效果而言,当社保基金持股信患公告后,公司在短期事件窗口累计超额收益率为正;长期业绩方面,社保基金持股与公司的经营业绩正相关。Based on listed companies in A-share market as samples, this paper studies the social security fund ownership preference, the path of governance and governance effect. The results show that the social security fund tends to invest the companies with high cash dividend distribution and the low concentration of ownership of enterprises. By effectively su- pervise the management and large shareholder, the social security fund improves corporate governance structure and enhances the efficiency of governance. In terms of governance effect, once companies announce the information of the social security fund ownership, the cumulative abnormal return of the companies will rise in the short term and the social security fund ownership positively related to the company＇s operating performance in the long term.

关 键 词：社保基金 股东积极主义 持股偏好 公司业绩 

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