研发会计改革增加分析师跟踪了吗  

Does R＆D Accounting Reform Increase Analyst Coverage？

作　　者：陈超[1] 潘晶晶[1] 赵武阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院会计系 [2]加拿大多伦多大学Rotman管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2014年第3期349-366,共18页China Accounting Review

摘　　要：本文探讨了2007年中国会计准则有关研发支出从费用化到有条件资本化的改革对分析师跟踪的影响。本文采取双重差分（Diff-in-Diff）的研究设计,使用四种方法来定义公司是否受研发会计改革的影响。结果发现,资本化改革之后,财务报告更能够反映公司的经营实质,降低分析师跟踪的成本,从而增加了分析师跟踪;且这种增加主要体现在会计质量较低以及非国有企业样本中。本文的研究表明新会计准则中针对研发支出的改革提高了会计信息的估值功能,具有积极的经济后果。This paper examines how the R＆D accounting reform in China in 2007 （from expensing to conditional capitalization） influenced analyst coverage. After the reform, financial reporting can better reflect the economic substance. As a result, the cost of coverage would be reduced, leading to stronger incentives for analysts to follow listed companies. We employ a Dill-in-Dill design and use four ways to define treatment group （firms affected by the reform） and control group （firms not affected by the reform）. Our results show that R＆D accounting reform increased analyst coverage; further inquiry shows that such increase only exists among firms with comparatively low accounting quality （AQ）. One possible ex- planation for this cross-sectional variation is that the accounting system of those firms with lower AQ is less efficient in reflecting the economic substance than that of those firms with higher AQ. Therefore, the improvement caused by R＆D accounting reform is more pro- nounced for those firms with lower AQ and non-state-owned enterprises. Our study shows that R＆D accounting reform has enhanced the valuation role of accounting information and led to positive economic consequences.

关 键 词：新会计准则 研发支出资本化 分析师跟踪 会计质量 股权结构 

分 类 号：F233[经济管理—会计学]