西部民族地区企业水污染治理监管的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Water Pollution Governance Supervision of Enterprises in Western China Minority Regions

作　　者：孙晗[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《贵州民族研究》2015年第6期38-41,共4页Guizhou Ethnic Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目国家利益保护导向的中国环境审计体系创新研究(11&-ZD044)

摘　　要：水污染治理监管体制下各方的利益博弈是影响西部民族地区企业水环境治理绩效的主要因素。从水污染治理利益相关者角度,阐述政府和社区公众在企业水污染治理监督中的作用,建立了地方政府—企业和企业—社区民众两个层面的混合战略博弈分析模型。博弈均衡结果表明,加强各级政府环境监管和相关政策支持、鼓励公众参与企业污染治理监督是促进西部民族地区企业水污染治理的重要手段。The game between stakeholders under reg ulatory system of water pollution governance is the main factor affecting the performance of enterprise＇s water pollution controlling in Western China Minority Regions. Based on stakeholders of water pollution governance, expounds the role of government and community in the supervision of enterprise＇s water pollution governance, establishs two mixed strategic game models between local government and enterprise as well as enterprise and community. Game equilibrium results indicate that strengthening environmental regulation of government at all levels and relevant policy support,encouraging public participation in the supervision of enterprises are important means to promote enterprises＇ water pollution governance in Western China Minority Regions.

关 键 词：民族地区 企业水污染治理 博弈 

分 类 号：X52[环境科学与工程—环境工程]