企业绿色技术创新扩散的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Diffusion of Green Technological Innovation of Enterprises

作　　者：曹霞[1] 张路蓬[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2015年第7期68-76,共9页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"产学研合作创新网络演化机理;模型及政策研究"(编号:71473055);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划"产学研合作创新的知识管理研究"(编号:NCET-11-0825);哈尔滨市科技局课题项目"促进哈尔滨市科技类中介机构发展对策研究"(编号:2009AC9CT108);中央高校基本科研业务经费支持计划"产学研合作创新网络的演化研究"(编号:HEUCF140901)

摘　　要：环境污染问题的日趋严重,使社会环境参与者对于企业绿色技术创新的要求不断加深,监督力度也随之加强。政府、创新企业以及公众消费者之间存在相互制约、相互影响的利益关系,同时多方利益相关者的行为准则也将影响绿色技术创新在社会系统中的扩散,因此,探究三方利益相关者对绿色创新行为以及绿色创新扩散的影响成为学者关注的重要问题之一。通过借鉴利益相关者理论,对社会系统中参与企业绿色创新的利益相关者进行利益、权利分析,构建政府、企业与公众消费者之间的三方演化博弈模型,根据演化的仿生学研究,引入Lotka-Volterra模型,探究环境利益相关者的规制行为,对于企业绿色技术创新扩散的演化影响,利用Matlab仿真工具,对演化博弈以及仿生演化模型进行数学推导求解并赋值仿真进行相关分析。结果表明:利益相关者的污染抵制措施在一定程度上,会促进绿色技术创新的扩散;高强度的污染税收、低强度的公众环保宣传与适度的创新激励补偿对企业绿色技术创新的促进效果最明显;公众对于绿色技术创新的推广促进其在社会系统中的扩散,而政府对于绿色创新技术的过度推广,则会降低绿色创新扩散效率。本文的研究对社会环境监管参与者起到一定的启示作用:第一,政府作为绿色创新的推动者及环境监管的权利机关,应注重把握监管力度,合理选择环境规制手段、规划环境规制成本,防止过激手段的实施对绿色技术创新带来的阻碍;第二,公众消费者对于绿色技术创新的推动作用更为广泛,因此,消费者应从自身做起,杜绝非环保产品,不断推动社会绿色创新技术的发展。第三,企业作为绿色技术创新的生产方,应将环境保护作为己任,努力研发环保类产品,减少环境污染及能源的消耗。As environmental pollution becomes increasingly serious, new demands from the government and public consumers for green technological innovation from enterprises are continuously growing, and along with that the supervision is also strengthened. Relationship of mutual restraint and interaction exists among the government, innovative enterprises and public consumers. Meanwhile, code of conduct of various stakeholders will also have influence on the diffusion of green technology innovation in the social systems. Hence, exploration and research of the influence of these three parties on green innovative activities and diffusion of green innovation is an important issue catching the attention of scholars. With reference to theories on stakeholders, on the basis of analysis of the profit and rights of stakeholders participating in the green innovation of enterprises in the social systems, the tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises and public consumers was built. According to bionics research of evolution, this paper introduced the Lotka-Voherra model to explore and research the influence of regulating behaviors of environmental stakeholders on evolution of diffusion of green technology innovation. Using the bionic tool of Matlab, this paper carried out mathematical derivation and solution with regard to the model of evolutionary game and bionic evolution, and conducted related analysis by assigning values. The results show that boycott of pollution from stakeholders to a certain extent will promote the diffusion of green technology innovation. High pollution tax, low intensity of public environmental protection propaganda and appropriate incentive compensation contribute most to enterprises＇ green technology innovation. While excessive environmental-friendly product publicity will suppress the green technology innovation diffusion efficiency. This paper will have certain enlightening effect onto the social participants of environmental supervision from the following aspects： Firstly, the

关 键 词：环境规制 绿色技术 创新扩散 演化博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]