矿业权协议出让中设租寻租行为的博弈分析  

A Game Model of Rent-setting and Seeking in Mining Lease

作　　者：段涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]河南工业大学管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《徐州工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2015年第4期62-65,共4页Journal of Xuzhou Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(41401630);河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究一般项目(2015-GH-244)

摘　　要：在矿业权协议出让中,政府地矿主管部门可能会向矿业权投资者设租寻租以谋求利益,而投资者为了获取矿业权,可能会向地矿主管部门支付租金。为此,监管部门会介入以杜绝各种寻租行为。文章建立了一个矿业权设租寻租的三方博弈模型,通过模型的具体实现,分析设租寻租行为的决定性因素,提出监管部门应提高监管效率,降低监管成本并严厉处罚的对策建议。In mining lease,a bureau of geology and mineral resources may be a rent-seeking part and seek benefit from mineral investors. The investors may pay rent to the bureau in order to get the mineral rights. Therefore, supervision departments will perform their respective duties to avoid various rent-seeking activities in mining lease. This paper builds a rent setting and seeking model which involves three parts. By realizing the game model, this paper analyses the decisive factors of rent-seeking activities and puts forward some countermeasures. It argues that supervision departments should improve their efficiency,cut down the supervision cost and severely punish the rent-seeking activities.

关 键 词：矿业权 协议出让 设租寻租 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F42[经济管理—产业经济]