不同控制权结构下内部并购对托宾Q值的影响  

Internal M&A's Effects on Tobin's Qunder Different Control Structures

作　　者：陈健[1] 贾隽[1] 郭添添[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安工业大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710032

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第7期24-31,共8页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BGL054);陕西省科技计划项目(2014KRM76-02);陕西省社科界2014年重大理论与现实问题研究项目(2014Z012);陕西省教育厅研究项目(2013JK0186)

摘　　要：本文通过隶属于企业集团的上市公司在集团内部的并购事件,分析在不同的上市公司控制结构下,这些内部并购行为对公司价值指标——托宾Q值的影响。实证分析结果显示,股权集中度对内部并购公告后的公司价值有负向影响。第1大股东持股比例越高,内部并购公告后的公司价值越小,说明大股东更倾向于通过内部并购掏空上市公司,损害上市公司的价值。股权制衡度对内部并购公告后的公司价值有负向影响,说明其他大股东可能与第1大股东存在联盟或者未充分履行监督职责。上市公司实际控制人的控制权和现金流权的分离程度与内部并购公告后的公司价值无关。Based on the events of intemal mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in their business groups, this paper analyzes the impact of internal M＆As on Tobin＇s Q of these listed companies under different ownership control structure. The results of empirical analysis show that the concentration of ownership has negative impact on the value of companies which announced internal M＆As. The higher proportion of the first largest shareholder holds, the higher the value of the company, which indicates that large shareholders are more inclined to support the listed companies through internal M＆As and enhance the value of these companies. The degree of balanced ownership power has negative impact on the value of listed companies which announced the internal M＆As, which indicates that other large shareholders maybe allied with largest shareholder, or they do not fully perform supervisory duties. And the separate degree of control rights and cash flow rights of ultimate controller of listed companies has no relationship with the value of companies which announced internal M＆As.

关 键 词：控制权结构 内部并购 托宾Q值 企业集团 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]