基于信息结构的供应链双向激励  

Double Incentives in Supply Chain Based on Information Structure

作　　者：黄梅萍[1,2] 汪贤裕[2] 

机构地区：[1]福州大学土木工程学院,福州350108 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610064

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第7期125-130,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071103);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(13YJC630053);福州大学科研启动项目(XRC-1267)

摘　　要：针对供应链双向激励中信息结构(信息的分布)对供销双方决策和利润的影响,主要考虑在双方地位相当的二级供应链中,供应商隐藏信息、销售商隐藏行动,引入虚拟第三方为利他的委托人,对交易双方同时进行激励,并分析成本和市场需求分布分别与销售商最优努力水平、供应链最优交易量及双方利润的关系。研究发现,销售商最优的努力和供应链最优的交易量均与供应商的成本、成本的信息结构呈现负相关关系,而与市场的信息结构呈现正相关关系;相较于供应商而言,销售商对供应商单位生产成本信息和市场需求波动引起的利润变化都更为敏感。最后通过仿真实验给出具体的算例。To analyze the information structure effect on the participators＇ decision-making and profit in double incentives,the virtual third party was introduced as an altruistic principal to incent the supplier and retailer at the same time in this paper. Then,the relationship of the production cost and market demand＇s distribution respectively with the retailer＇s optimal effort,the supply chain＇s optimal trade quantity,and the participant＇s profits were discussed. Results show that both of the optimal effort and trade quantity were negatively related to the information structure of production cost,while had positive correlation to information structure of demand. Moreover,compared to the supplier,the retailer was more sensitive to the fluctuations of cost information and market demand. Finally,an application was given by simulation.

关 键 词：二级供应链 信息结构 双向激励 虚拟第三方 委托代理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]