资金约束下基于零售商竞争的融资模式对比研究  

A Research on Financing Model Selection Based on Retailer Competition with Capital Constraints

作　　者：林强[1] 贺勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《工业工程》2015年第3期22-29,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271152)

摘　　要：以单供应商与多个零售商的供应链为研究背景,供应商是供应链上的核心企业,而零售商面临着资金约束,与供应商签订收益共享契约。供应商为中小企业提供两种融资方式:保兑仓融资和延迟支付融资。本文研究两种融资对供应链绩效以及供应链各方的影响,构建单供应商和多零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,发现保兑仓融资模式能增加零售商的订货量,这两种融资模式在分散型供应链下,供应商都可以设置合适的收益分配系数和批发价格实现在集中型供应链下的协调,并能够保证供应商利润最大化。A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a lot of retailers is used as the background of this re- search. All retailers are small and have financing difficulties. Revenue sharing contract is signed between the supplier and each retailer. To improve the supply chain performance, the supplier provides two finan- cing ways for retailers. They are delay payment and confirmed warehouse. A research is conducted into the impact of these two financing modes on the supply chain performance. A Stackelberg game model is used to compare these two financing modes. The retailer~ optimal order quantity under confirmed warehouse is larger than that under delay payment. It is found that in the case of centralized supply chain these two fi- nancing modes can coordinate the supply chain, while in the decentralized supply chain, the wholesale price and income distribution factor can maximize supplier profit and coordinate the supply chain at the same time.

关 键 词：资金约束 收益共享契约 延迟支付 保兑仓融资 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]