直供物流模式与农户安全生产行为——基于演化博弈的策略研究  

Direct Supply Logistics Mode and Farmers' Safe Productive Behaviors:Strategy Research on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：彭竞[1,2] 杜两省[3] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学军需科技学院 [2]吉林大学经济学院 [3]东北财经大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2015年第8期77-84,共8页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"转变经济增长方式的重点和难点:风险分析;控制系统和激励机制研究"(12&ZD067);中国博士后基金项目"农产品物流模式选择与农户安全生产行为研究"(2014M551199);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"刘易斯转折点后的非农就业转移决策--基于配置效率的研究视角"(13YJC790113)

摘　　要：本文以农户的经济行为为研究视角构建演化博弈模型,考察农户与超市选择直供物流模式的路径依赖。结果显示,双方选择直供策略的概率与农户的盈利系数比和超市的额外收益呈正相关,与成本系数和风险系数负相关。在此基础上,本文从直供收购价格、农业生产技术、质量安全控制和长期合作意向四个方面探索促进双方选择直供模式下,农户实施安全生产行为的有效途径。In this paper,an evolution game model is created with the perspective of economic behaviors of farmers in order to study the path dependency of choosing direct supply logistics mode by farmers and the supermarkets. Results show that the probability of both choosing direct supply mode is in a positive correlation with the profit coefficient of farmers and additional revenue of supermarkets,and in a negative correlation with cost coefficient as well as risk coefficient. On this basis,supposed that both of them are in choosing of direct supply mode,this paper explores the effective methods of safe productive behaviors,on the purchasing price of direct supply,technology of agricultural production,the safety and quality control and long-term cooperation intention.

关 键 词：农户生产行为 直供模式 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F323.7[经济管理—产业经济]