政策性负担、薪酬委员会独立性与经理人超额薪酬——来自后股改时期国有上市公司的证据  

Policy Burdens, Independence of Compensation Committee and Managers' Over-Payment:Evidences from State-Owned Listed Companies during the Post Stock Reform Period

作　　者：叶建宏[1] 汪炜[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2015年第4期31-41,共11页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目"制度性贫困与包容性增长减贫模式研究"(11CJL033);浙江省哲学社会科学基金重点项目"浙江省民间融资管理研究"(12YD01Z)

摘　　要：从企业政策性负担和薪酬委员会治理视角,考察股权分置改革后中国国有上市公司经理人的超额薪酬问题,在控制了导致超额薪酬的制度因素之后,发现企业政策性负担能显著降低经理人超额薪酬,薪酬委员会的独立性并不能抑制经理人超额薪酬。在政策性负担较低的公司,薪酬委员会的独立性反而会减弱大股东对经理人的监督强度。进一步研究表明,经理人超额薪酬并不能带来公司代理成本的降低,只有正常薪酬才能降低代理成本。研究结论支持了"薪酬辩护假说"和"高管权力假说",推进了国企高管薪酬理论的研究。From the perspective of busine ss policy burdens and the governance of compensation committees, this paper studies the issue of managers＇ over-payment in China＇s state-owned listed companies after the split-share reform. After controlling the institutional factors leading to over-payment, it is found that business policy burdens can significantly reduce managers＇ over-payment, while the independence of compensation committees cannot inhibit managers＇ over-payment. In companies with lower policy burdens, the independence of the compensation committees would weaken the strength of supervision over the managers by the major shareholders. Further studies show that managers＇ over-payment cannot bring down the company agency costs, only the normal payment can reduce the agency costs. The findings of this study can support the＂ payment defense hypothesis＂ and the＂ executive power hypothesis＂, which can promote the study of the theory of state-owned executive pay.

关 键 词：政策性负担 薪酬委员会独立性 超额薪酬 国有企业 

分 类 号：F244.2[经济管理—劳动经济]