国有企业审计招标的制度安排及其优化研究  

Study on the Institutional Arrangements of Competitive Bidding for Audit Services to SOEs and the Relevant Policy Proposals

作　　者：陈波[1] 吴卫军 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院 [2]普华永道中天会计师事务所

出　　处：《审计研究》2015年第4期39-46,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(项目批准号:09CJY017);国家自然科学基金(项目批准号:71262013);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(项目批准号:3154131101)资助

摘　　要：国有企业审计招标制是一项与国有企业审计市场准入管制、审计师选聘权重新配置、审计合约订立过程重构以及审计师轮换要求密切结合的重大制度安排。审计招标制能够显著降低国有企业的审计费用,但其能够提高审计质量的观点则欠缺充分的理论依据与经验证据。国有企业审计招标制目前存在的主要问题是入围招标及其排名容易导致设租与寻租行为、招标程序设计不利于缓解招投标双方的信息不对称、评标过程存在偏重报价因素忽视质量因素的倾向、缺乏科学合理的操作性指引及必要的监督等。国有资产管理部门应改进或取消入围招标及其排名,优化招标程序以利于招投标双方信息的有效沟通,促使审计质量成为中标与否的决定性因素,出台审计招标的操作性指引并加强对于招投标过程的监督。The system of competitive in China. It is closely related to the bidding for audit services to SOEs is one of the key systems in the audit market regulation on the access to SOE audit market, the re-allocation of rights to hire auditors, the restructuring of audit contracting process, and the auditor rotation requirements. It can significantly reduce audit fees paid by SOEs, but it lacks both sound theoretical foundations and sufficient evidence to support that this system can undoubtedly improve audit quality. The major problems with this system include the high probabilities of rent-setting and rent-seeking induced by the bidding and ranking, the information asymmetry between the renderers and bidders exacerbated by improperly designed bidding procedures, the over-emphasis of bidding price and ignorance of quality factors in the bidding process and the lack of scientific and rational operational guidance and necessary monitoring. We propose that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission abandon or improve the entry regulations on SOE audit market, facilitate the communication between the tenderers and bidders, make audit quality the determining factor in the bidding evaluation process, formulate detailed guidelines and strengthen monitoring of bidding activities.

关 键 词：国有企业 审计招标 审计质量 审计收费 

分 类 号：F239.4[经济管理—会计学] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]