Why Greater Cash Holdings and Short-Term Debt Simultaneously Persist？ The Case of Transition Economy  

作　　者：Lu Dai Qingbin Meng Maozhu Sun 

机构地区：[1]School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Business Research in China》2015年第2期207-242,共36页中国高等学校学术文摘·工商管理研究（英文版）

基　　金：The research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant no. 71172181 and 71302155）, and the Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project.

摘　　要：This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.

关 键 词：cash holdings short-term debt agency conflicts TUNNELING largestshareholders PUZZLE financial policy 

分 类 号：F123.1[经济管理—世界经济] F275