基于博弈论视角的涉诉信访危机应对策略研究  

Analysis of the Crisis Response Strategies of Prosecution-related Letters and Visits Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王小新[1] 李雪蓉[1] 乔晗[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《管理评论》2015年第7期199-206,共8页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71003057;71373262)

摘　　要：涉诉信访在增加公民利益表达机制、拓展司法权监督渠道、推动法制改革进程等方面起了重大的推动作用,建立科学实用的风险预警与危机应对机制,对有效化解或减少危害社会稳定问题的发生具有重大意义。本文首次应用博弈论方法分析涉诉信访的风险防范策略,建立涉诉信访的完全信息和不完全信息的静态博弈模型,分析人民法院司法配置的最优策略。模型结果表明,人民法院可从风险预警模型中得到当事人易于上访的先验概率,然后基于博弈模型的贝叶斯均衡进行司法资源配置,合理防范涉诉信访风险。本文将博弈论模型均衡结果与风险预警模型相结合,创新性地提出了防范涉诉信访风险的应对策略。Prosecution-related letters and visits objectively increased the expression mechanism of the interest of the citizens, expanded the channels of judiciary supervision, and promoted the process of legal reform. It is of great practical significance for People＇ s Court to establish scientific and practical risk early warning and crisis response mechanism, thus effectively solve or reduce harm of social stability problems. This paper is the first attempt to analyses risk prevention strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits using game theory models. Dynamic game models of complete information and incomplete information are established. The equilibrium outcomes show that the prior probability of petition can be obtained from the risk early warning model, and the People＇ s Court could allocate judicial resources and prevent risks based on the Bayesian Equilibrium. This paper combines equilibrium outcomes of games and risk early warning models, and proposes risk prevention and coping strategies of prosecution-related letters and visits.

关 键 词：涉诉信访 博弈论 不完全信息 危机管理 

分 类 号：D926.2[政治法律—法学] D632.8