无证书聚合签名方案的安全性分析和改进  

Security Analysis and Improvements of Certificateless Aggregate Signature Schemes

作　　者：张玉磊[1] 李臣意 王彩芬[1] 张永洁 

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学计算机科学与工程学院,兰州730070 [2]甘肃卫生职业学院,兰州730000

出　　处：《电子与信息学报》2015年第8期1994-1999,共6页Journal of Electronics & Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(61163038;61262056;61262057);甘肃省高等学校科研项目(2013A-014);西北师范大学青年教师科研能力提升计划项目(NWNU-LKQN-12-32)资助课题

摘　　要：该文分析了He等人(2014)提出的无证书签名方案和Ming等人(2014)提出的无证书聚合签名方案的安全性,指出Ming方案存在密钥生成中心(KGC)被动攻击,He方案存在KGC被动攻击和KGC主动攻击。该文描述了KGC对两个方案的攻击过程,分析了两个方案存在KGC攻击的原因,最后对Ming方案提出了两类改进。改进方案不仅克服了原方案的安全性问题,同时也保持了原方案聚合签名长度固定的优势。The security of certificateless signature scheme which was proposed by He et al. （2014） is analyzed, and the security of the certificateless aggregate signature scheme which was proposed by Ming et al. （2014） is analyzed too. It is pointed out that the Key Generation Center （KGC） can realize the passive attacks in the Ming＇s scheme. It is also pointed out that KGC can realize the passive attack and initiative attack respectively in the Nimg＇s scheme. The processes of concrete forgery attacks which perfored by KGC are shown, and the possible reasons are analyzed. Finally, two improved Ming＇s schemes are proposed. The improved schemes not only overcome the security problem of original scheme but also have an advantage that the length of aggregated signature is fixed.

关 键 词：密码学 聚合签名 无证书签名 密钥生成中心攻击 选择消息攻击 计算Diffie—Hellman困难问题 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]