对知识三元分析的柏拉图传统的辩护  

In Defense of the Platonic Tradition of the Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge

作　　者：魏燕侠[1] 

机构地区：[1]华侨大学哲学与社会发展学院,厦门361021

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2015年第4期60-64,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目"华侨大学哲学社会科学青年学者成长工程"(12SKGC-QT06)

摘　　要：在分析知识论中,一个未曾被完善回答的重要理论问题是:知识论史上存在着知识三元分析的柏拉图传统吗?柏拉图首先提出了真信念加上第三要素构成知识这一问题;休谟认为恰当的信念构成了知识;康德则主张知识是有着客观充分性的信念;罗素强调知识与信念是种属关系,他更早地给出了葛梯尔型反例,并针对知识三元分析模式的缺陷提出了可能主义的解决方案。文章将分析知识论历史上溯到了柏拉图时期,沟通了知识的发生学研究与结构学研究之间的所谓"转变",实现了知识论与认识论的统一,奠定了葛梯尔问题的合法性基础。In analytic epistemology,there remains an important unsolved theoretical problem： Is there the Platonic tradition of the tripartite analysis of knowledge in the history of epistemology？ Plato raised the question ＂that the third element together with true belief forms knowledge＂; Hume argued that knowledge is suitable belief; Kant held knowledge as belief with objective adequacy while Russell emphasized that knowledge is a kind of belief. He presented with some counter examples of Gettier cases and offered a possible solution to the defect of the tripartite analysis of knowledge. The paper traces the history of analytic epistemology to the period of Plato and connects the socalled ＂shift＂between the genetic and the structural research on knowledge,laying the foundation for the legitimacy of Gettier problem.

关 键 词：知识三元分析 柏拉图传统 葛梯尔问题 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]