中国官僚制的效率逻辑——基于一项典型政治社会活动的观察  

The Efficient Logic of Chinese Bureaucracy——Based on an Observation of an Important Political and Social Activity

作　　者：郑崇明[1] 

机构地区：[1]海南大学政治与公共管理学院,海口570208

出　　处：《甘肃行政学院学报》2015年第3期72-80,127-128,共9页Journal of Gansu Administration Institute

摘　　要：将任务是否常规和任务绩效是否可测进行区别性组合,建构官僚制的效率模型,即不同场景下官僚制的效率存在明显的差异。非常规可测任务场景下的官僚制效率极高,常规可测任务情景下次之,非常规不可测任务下的官僚制效率处于两个极端,要么很高,要么很低。在中国人事干部制度安排的约束下,隐藏在官僚制效率模型背后的是基于官员的激励强弱结构。论文重点以一个典型的政治社会活动案例阐述了非常规可测任务下官僚制高效运行的行为逻辑。但政治压力下的高效率也意味着预算最大化的空间。This paper constructs an efficiency model of bureaucracy that based on whether the task is conventional and whether the task performance is measured. From this model, we find that the efficiency of bureaucracy is different in different situations.The efficiency of unconventional measurable task is highest; the efficiency of conventional measurement task is second highest,and the efficiency of unconventional immeasurable task is either very high or very low. In the arrangement of Chinese personnel system, the most important factor which affects the efficiency model mentioned above is the incentives of the officers ' promotion.This paper tests the hypothesis of the efficiency of unconventional measurable task in the model with a case of an important political and social activity. However, under the political pressure, high efficiency also means budget maximization.

关 键 词：官僚制 效率模型 行政激励 官员晋升 行政组织目标任务 预算最大化 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]