不确定策略对发电侧定价的激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism of Uncertain Strategy to Generation-side Pricing

作　　者：韦加雄 昌健[2] 王莉芳[2] 李强[2] 董稳改 

机构地区：[1]国网陕西省电力公司营销部,陕西西安710048 [2]西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《电力科学与工程》2015年第7期30-33,共4页Electric Power Science and Engineering

摘　　要：现有的对电力市场的研究以确定策略下的寡头博弈模型为主,但这种确定策略框架却不符合现实中寡头厂商会改变策略的情形。建立了不确定策略框架下的Bertrand双寡头模型,对其数值仿真并将结果与确定策略框架下的模型进行比较。结果表明发电厂商采用不确定策略能带来比采用确定策略更多的利润,且能保证电价的稳定。说明让各企业采取自己合适的策略竞争可以提高市场效率。Recent studies on electric market are mainly based on certain-strategy framework, but a framework like this does not go with the fact that the oligarches could change their strategy. A Bertrand duopoly model is set up in an uncertain-strategy framework, numeric simulation is implemented and comparison is made with the counterpart in the certain-strategy framework. Result shows that uncertain strategy could lead more profits and a stable electric price compared with certain strategy, which demonstrates a suitable strategy could enhance market efficiency of a firm.

关 键 词：Bertrand双寡头模型 不确定策略 数值仿真 市场效率 

分 类 号：F224.31[经济管理—国民经济]