“意义整体论”的证立与反驳——从蒯因、戴维森到福多  

The Justification and Refutation of Meaning Holism——From Quine, Davidson to Fodor

作　　者：施展旦[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系,南京210023

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2015年第8期3-8,共6页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要："意义整体论"在当代语言哲学及心灵哲学中具有重要的理论地位与广泛影响。在蒯因确立的意义整体论的基本观点的基础上,戴维森通过"彻底解释理论"将其发展为全面的整体论。而福多在其心灵表征理论的驱动下,通过对意义的双重结构的区分,对意义整体论提出了一系列的批判。但这些批判并不能构成对意义整体论的彻底否定。从其对整体论论证模式的几个层次的分析来看,尚有进一步讨论的空间。Meaning holism has the important position and widely influence in contemporary philosophy of language and mind. Based on the holist standpoint of Quine, Davidson develop holism from the theory of radical interpretation. Driven by the theory of mental representation, Fodor differentiate double levels of meaning, and then criticize meaning holism from the stance of mind. But these critics couldn＇t be the radical refutation of holism. There also have a set of issues to discuss on the Fodor＇s argument of holism.

关 键 词：意义整体论 彻底解释 意向实在论 分析性 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]