环保PPP模式下的雾霾治理及投融资博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Investment and Financing Policies for Governing Haze Based on the PPP Mode

作　　者：孙艳丽[1] 岳树杰 刘承宪[2] 刘永健[3] 刘倩兮[4] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳建筑大学文法学院,辽宁沈阳110168 [2]沈阳建筑大学建设项目管理公司,辽宁沈阳110168 [3]沈阳建筑大学基本建设处,辽宁沈阳110168 [4]华东理工大学社会与公共管理学院,上海200237

出　　处：《沈阳建筑大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第4期760-768,共9页Journal of Shenyang Jianzhu University：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(51208312);辽宁省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(W2013092);辽宁省科学事业公益研究基金项目(2013004018);沈阳市社会科学研究课题(SYSK2015-09-01)

摘　　要：目的对环保PPP模式下雾霾治理分析,提出雾霾治理对策和投融资建议,为雾霾治理的科学投融资提供理论指导,解决雾霾治理遭遇污染尺度大、资金匮乏等问题.方法在剖析雾霾现状和雾霾治理投融资现状的基础上,提出基于环保PPP模式的雾霾治理投融资管理;对政府和投融资行为作出基本假设,构建政府与投资群体的非对称博弈模型;通过模型计算政府群体期望收益和投融资群体期望收益,为雾霾治理中资金流入和流出的合理控制提供理论依据.结果建立政府与投融资群体进化博弈动态演化趋势图,确定非对称博弈结构演化特性改变的阙值.结论通过对政府和投融资群体博弈方的分析,提出政府应该加大激励力度、提高公信力,应根据市场情况机动地调节激励政策.In order to provide some references for scientific investment and financing in haze gov- ernance, based on the environmental protection PPP （ public-private partnership ） mode, this paper proposed haze countermeasures, investment and financing advises. Through basic assumptions, an asymmetric game model for the government and the investment community was built. Expected re- turns of government and investment-financing groups were calculated with the model. The dynamicevolution trend chart for government and investment-financing groups was obtained and the change threshold for asymmetric evolution behavior of the game structure was determined. Conclusion is that the government should give more economic incentives, make efforts to improve the credibility and adjust incentive oolicies based on market conditions.

关 键 词：雾霾治理 环保PPP 博弈分析法 投融资 

分 类 号：TU196[建筑科学—建筑理论]