农产品供应链信息共享博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Information Sharing in Agricultural Produce Supply Chain

作　　者：李志刚[1] 冯萍萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学,新疆石河子832000

出　　处：《物流技术》2015年第13期207-209,共3页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于SOA架构的新疆绿色农产品封闭供应链信息共享和集成建模研究"(71261021);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目"基于SOA架构的新疆农产品供应链信息共享机制研究"(10XJJCZH002)

摘　　要：主要研究了两种供应链信息共享的博弈分析,第一种考虑共享信息成本的静态囚徒困境模型分析;第二种为供应链企业间信息共享无限重复博弈模型,分析得出:企业双方都选择冷酷战略(即企业长期共享信息)能获得更高利益。最后从政策支持、技术应用和行业激励三方面为企业实现信息共享提出了保障措施。In this paper, we mainly studied two supply chain information sharing games, the first being the static prisoner dilemma model that considered the information sharing cost and the second being the infinitely repeated game model for supply chain inter-enterprise information sharing, then analyzed the scenario where the parties in the information sharing all took the harsh stance, and at the end, from the aspects of policy support, technical application and industrial motivation, proposed the measures to encourage the information sharing activities of the enterprises.

关 键 词：农产品 供应链 信息共享 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F252.8