跨江联动发展驱动机制及合作城市间动态博弈研究——以江苏为例  

A Study on the Driving Mechanism of Interactive Development across the River and Dynamic Game among Cooperative Cities—— The Case of Jiangsu Province

作　　者：胡俊峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2015年第8期33-38,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目(2013sjb6300078)

摘　　要：跨江发展是沿江城市扩展其经济社会发展空间、促进区域协调发展的重要举措。城市化进程加快、基础设施不断完善以及转型升级等推动力为江苏实施跨江联动发展提供了契机。通过对文献的深度梳理发现,江苏跨江联动发展的实质就是城市间的合作。基于上述考量,文章从探讨江苏跨江发展模式和驱动机制入手,应用博弈模型分析跨江合作城市的策略选择,得出合作是合作城市的唯一纳什均衡解的结论。由于共建园区是江苏跨江联动的主要形式,而园区的收益分配机制是城市合作的基础,对共建园区产出—分享模型的推导,诠释了合作双方的努力程度与分配比例、贡献系数、创新性成本之间的关系。在此基础上,对江苏跨江发展提出了对策建议。Interactive cooperation across the river is an important step which the cities along the river expand their space ofeconomic and social development and promote regional coordinated development. The impetus, such as acceleration of urbanization, continuous improvement of infrastructure and industrial structure transformation and upgrading, etc., offers an opportu-nity for regional interactive development across the river in Jiangsu province. By studying literatures, the essence of interactivedevelopment across the river in the province is the cooperation among the cities. Based on the above considerations, this paperobtains the conclusion that the cooperation is the sole solution of Nash Equilibrium by starting to explore the developmentmode and driving mechanism across the river and applying the game model to analyze the strategic choice of cooperative citiesacross the river. Because the co-construction industrial park is the main form of interactive cooperation across the river in theprovince and the income distribution mechanism of the park is the basis of cooperation among cities, the output-sharing modelof co-construction industrial park is derived to interpret the relationship between the two sides in level of effort, distribution ratio, contribution factor and cost of innovation. And on this basis, the paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions forthe development across the river in Jiangsu province.

关 键 词：跨江合作 驱动机制 纳什均衡 产出—分享模型 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济]