管理层权力、制度环境与企业资本扩张  

Managerial Power, Institutional Environment and Capital Expansion

作　　者：贺琛[1] 陈少华[2] 余晴[3] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361021 [2]厦门大学会计发展研究中心,福建厦门361005 [3]集美大学工商管理学院,福建厦门361021

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2015年第8期102-109,164,共9页East China Economic Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11JJD790006)

摘　　要：文章立足于我国转轨经济的制度背景,以制度经济学与控制权理论为基础,选取2009-2013年我国资本市场A股上市公司的数据,实证检验了管理层权力、制度环境与企业资本扩张之间的关系。检验结果发现;管理层集权具有更大的资本扩张倾向,表现为显著提高了企业过度投资的水平,且这种影响在民营企业表现得更显著;制度环境对管理层的投资扩张行为具有显著的制约作用,分组检验也同样支持了制度环境的约束作用。文章分别从宏观环境和微观企业的角度提出了相应的治理对策。Based on the institutional economics and the control theory,and combining with the institutional context of economic transition period in China,this paper,by selecting the data of China＇s A-share listed corporations from 2009 to2013,empirically tests the correlation among managerial power,institutional environment and capital expansion. The empirical results show that the centralized management is more inclined to capital expansion,which manifests the significant increase of the level of excessive investment,especially in private enterprises. However,the institutional environment notablycurbs the capital expansion behavior of management,which is also verified by grouping empirical research. Finally,this paper puts forward some policy recommendations from the perspective of both macro environment and micro enterprises respectively.

关 键 词：管理层权力 制度环境 控制权理论 资本扩张 过度投资 

分 类 号：F406.1[经济管理—产业经济]