博弈均衡、要素品质与契约选择——关于佃农理论的进一步思考  

Game Equilibrium,Factor Characteristics,and Contractual Choice——An Inquiry into the Share Tenancy Theory

作　　者：罗必良[1] 何一鸣[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,510642

出　　处：《经济研究》2015年第8期162-174,共13页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71333004);教育部创新团队发展计划(IRT-14R17)的资助

摘　　要：传统佃农理论之所以认为分成契约低于定额租约的效率,是因为忽视了风险因素。本文证明,如果将风险问题转换为交易费用约束并使工资率满足一定条件,则分成契约与定额租约将具有相同效果。进一步放松要素同质的假设,利用博弈模型分析表明,低质量土地和高能力佃农的要素组合与分成契约匹配,定额租约则适用于高质量土地和低能力佃农的要素组合;并且,定额租约和分成契约分别是信息对称和不对称结构下的最优制度选择。文章运用20世纪初中国的农户调查数据对理论模型进行了检验。Traditional tenancy theory suggests the sharecropping contractual efficiency is less than the fix-rent contract＇s efficiency without considering the risk factor. When it is transformed into transaction cost and the wage rate reaches certain condition, the conclusion that the sharecropping contract has the same efficiency with the fix-rent contract can be proved. What＇s more, if the game theory model relaxes the homogeneous factor assumption, then we can get these hypotheses： low quality land and high ability labor are matching with the sharecropping contract; by contrast, high quality land and low ability labor are matching with the fix-rent contract. Basing on it, it proves that the fix-rent contract is the best choice under the symmetry information structure and the sharecropping contract is the best arrangement in the asymmetry information environment. At last, it uses the historical empirical data from Professor Buck＇s research about 2866 peasantries in 7 provinces of China in the earlier 20 century to test implication of the theoretic hypothesis.

关 键 词：风险费用 要素品质 契约匹配 佃农理论 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]