被忽略的认知运气——论葛梯尔问题的实质与德性知识论  

The Overlooked Epistemic Luck——On the Essence of Gettier Problem and the Virtue Epistemology

作　　者：李锋锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学哲学系,厦门361005

出　　处：《北京社会科学》2015年第8期105-112,共8页Social Sciences of Beijing

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(14ZDB012)

摘　　要：葛梯尔问题的实质是认知运气。葛梯尔问题被提出以后,知识论者们试图寻找第四个条件来解决此问题,从而形成了以JTB+X的方式来定义知识。X看似解决了葛梯尔问题,实际上它们都在解决认知运气的问题,同时自身也面临着认知运气的威胁。不论X的提出还是受到的质疑与批判等,都以认知运气为焦点。当JTB+X式的知识分析不能解决问题的时候,一些知识论者对知识的分析产生了质疑,从而走上了对知识的规范性解释,产生了德性知识论。不论是以格雷科为代表的强德性知识论者还是以普理查德为代表的温和的德性知识论者,都致力于认知运气的解决,正是认知运气推动了德性知识论的产生和发展。The essence of Gettier Problem is the epistemic luck. Epistemologists have been searching for the fourth condition to save the Gettier Problem since it was came up with that JTB+X could be used to define the knowledge. X seems to solve Gettier Problem. But it deals with and is threatened by the epistemic luck. Both the proposition of X and the suspicion and critique it receives focuses on the epistemic luck. Many epistemologists question the effectiveness of the analysis of knowledge when JTB+X cannot solve the problem. Therefore, they turn to the normative explanation of knowledge where virtue epistemology is established. Both robust virtue epistemology represented by Greco, and modest virtue epistemology represented by Pritchard, devote to deal with the epistemic luck. It is the epistemic luck that drives the establishment and development of virtue epistemology.

关 键 词：葛梯尔问题 认知运气 德性知识论 

分 类 号：B152[哲学宗教—世界哲学]