利益守成型村庄治理及其突破——基于江西L村的选举与治理观察  

Village Governance of Conservative Interest and Its Breakthrough:Based on Observation of Election and Governance in Village L,Jiangxi

作　　者：孔卫拿[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽师范大学历史与社会学院,安徽芜湖241002

出　　处：《福建行政学院学报》2015年第4期17-25,共9页Journal of Fujian Administration Institute

基　　金：安徽师范大学2014年度博士科研启动基金重点项目(2014bsqdjj22);安徽师范大学2015年度校科研创新基金项目(2015cxjj08)

摘　　要：农村村干部的角色与行为逻辑,是分析乡村社会权力结构与村庄性质的一个重要基础问题。村庄权力精英的变迁在很大程度上塑造了村治模式的动态变化。通过对江西一个典型的内陆农业型村庄L村的田野调研发现,在国家—社会关系、乡村社会结构的解释之外,治村精英本身的治理逻辑会对乡村精英的继替产生重大影响。在经历了"赢利型经纪""铁血代理人"之后,乡村社会基于自我保护的地方性知识,与"利益守成型村干部"形成了强有力的耦合机制。基于项目下乡、市场冲击、村民自治三者的共同作用,"利益守成型村干部"及其治理模式逐渐为新型的富裕能人治村所打破。当然,这一变迁过程的机制与后续效应,仍需在经验研究中进一步观察与分析。The role and behavior logic of rural village cadres are important basic issues in analyzing the power structure and the nature of rural society. The changes of the elite of the village power have largely shaped the dynamic changes of the village governance model. Through a field survey in a typical inland agricultural village in village L, Jiangxi, we find that in addition to the interpretation of the state-society relations and the structure of the rural society, the logic of village governance elite has a significant impact on the following elite. After the ＂profitable agent＂ and the ＂iron agent＂, rural society has formed a strong coupling mechanism with ＂interests defending village cadres＂ based on the local knowledge of self protection. On the foundation of interaction among projects to the countryside, market impact and village autonomy, ＂interests defending village cadres＂ and its governance model have gradually been broken by the new rich talent oriented village governance. Of course, the mechanism and the subsequent effect of this change still need to be further observed and analyzed in the empirical research.

关 键 词：利益守成 村干部 富裕能人 村治模式 

分 类 号：D621[政治法律—政治学]