跨区域公共治理中的地方政府行为模式:一个理论框架  

Local Government Behavior Patterns in Cross Regional Public Governance:A Theoretical Framework

作　　者：马丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]中共中央党校党的建设教研部,北京100091

出　　处：《福建行政学院学报》2015年第4期32-37,共6页Journal of Fujian Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(14CZZ041)

摘　　要：地方政府作为跨区域公共治理的重要主体,其行为模式及所扮演的角色对治理成效有重要影响。我国地方政府在参与跨区域公共治理时,会综合中央政府(或其它上级政府)的激励-约束和是否具有地方政府利益进行行为模式的反应。基于中央政府的激励-约束程度和是否具有地方政府利益两个维度,可以提出一个地方政府参与跨区域公共治理行为模式的理论分析框架,这一框架概括了地方政府参与跨区域公共治理的五种行为策略:自发性执行、自发性试验、政治性执行、行政性执行和无行动。The local government is the main body of the cross regional public governance, whose behavior patterns and roles have important influence on the governance effect. In our country＇s practice, the local government＇s participation in the cross regional public governance is effected by the incentive- restraint mechanism from the central government （or the superior government）. And it is also affected by whether there is local government interest in the participation. Based on the two dimensions of the degree of central government＇s incentive-restraint and whether there is local government interest or not, a theoretical analysis framework for the local government involvements in cross regional public governance behavior patterns is proposed in this paper, which summarizes five local government behavior patterns in the cross regional public participation of the local government： initiative implementation, initiative experiment, political implementation, administrative implementation and administrative omission.

关 键 词：跨区域公共治理 地方政府 中央-地方关系 公共物品 

分 类 号：D625[政治法律—政治学]