府际关系、纵向分权与环境管理向度  

Intergovernmental Relations,Vertical Decentralization and Environmental Management

作　　者：王猛[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学公共管理学院,北京100872

出　　处：《改革》2015年第8期103-112,共10页Reform

摘　　要：从外部性、信息不对称和规模效应三原则探讨政府纵向事权划分的基本框架,并依据三原则划分中央与地方政府的环境管理责任。整体而言,全国性的公共产品由中央政府承担;准全国性的公共物品具有利益外溢性和区域性特征,需要进行跨区域的协调和分工,则由中央和地方政府联合提供或多个同级地方政府联合提供或由地方政府提供并由中央政府转移支付;地区性公共产品由地方政府供给。环境质量并不是决定省级政府环保财政支出的关键变量,地方政府环保财政支出是"能力导向型"而非"需求驱动型"。改善环境质量,需建立起环境管理事权与财权、需求与责任相匹配的制度体系,真正落实各级政府财政责任。The principles of externality, information asymmetry and scale effect determine the framework of government vertical responsibility division and divide the environmental management responsibility between the central and local governments. Generally speaking, nationwide public goods are supplied by the central government. Quasi-nationwide goods, with spillover effect and regionality, call for cross-regional coordination and division and thus are supplied jointly by both the central and local governments, or by several local governments at the same level, or by the local government with the transfer payment from the central government. Local public goods are supplied by local governments. It is shown that environmental quality isn＇t the key variable to determine the provincial environmental protection expenditure. The local environmental protection expenditure belongs to the ＂ability-oriented＂ type rather than the ＂demand-driven＂ type. For the purpose of improving environmental quality, a proper institution system should be established that environment management responsibility matches with fiscal power and environmental demand consists with responsibility, and the responsibility of government at all levels should be practically implemented.

关 键 词：府际关系 环境监管 生态建设 

分 类 号：F123.14[经济管理—世界经济]