媒体监督与控股股东侵占——一个理论框架  

Media supervision and large shareholder's expropriation:A theoretical framework

作　　者：孟庆斌[1] 汪昌云[2] 张永冀[3,4] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872 [3]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081 [4]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第8期1905-1917,共13页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(31702156;71272150;71432008;71102110)

摘　　要：本文利用随机动态优化工具建立理论模型,对媒体监督与控股股东侵占行为进行了研究.结论表明,控股股东侵占损害中小股东福利,增大公司风险;媒体监督对控股股东自身福利产生双重效应——财富分配效应和资产减值效应,控股股东最优侵占比例取决于这两种效应的相对强弱;提高媒体对控股股东侵占现象反应的敏感性,增强曝光力度,能够迫使控股股东更加重视自身声誉,减少对中小股东利益的侵占;控股股东与媒体的合谋会使其更加大胆地通过侵占中小股东利益,提高自身福利.We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic model to investigate the effect of media on controlling shareholders and the related welfare implications. Our model shows that, under media supervision, controlling shareholders＇ tunneling behavior decreases the welfare of minority shareholders, and affects themselves through two offsetting effects： Wealth reallocation effect and value impairment effect. The equilibrium expropriating ratio （of firm value） depends on the tradeoff between these two effects. Moreover, media supervision＇s sensitivity and intensity will decrease controlling shareholders＇ equilibrium expropriation ratio. We further show that the collusion of controlling shareholders and media will make controlling shareholders＇ expropriation more aggressive, which brings in a larger welfare loss to minority shareholders.

关 键 词：媒体监督 控股股东侵占 福利 随机动态优化 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]