Palepu假设的Nash均衡检验  

Disproving Palepu assumptions via Nash equilibrium

作　　者：陈圻[1] 陈佳[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,南京210016 [2]科罗拉多大学博尔德分校,博尔德80302

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第8期1956-1967,共12页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金重点项目(AGL11001)

摘　　要：本文将系统的数理建模方法引入竞争战略领域,并首次与财务分析结合进行竞争战略识别博弈建模.开发基于不对称效用函数并含有DuPont体系财务参数的Nash均衡模型,提出等绩效约束条件,以Porter的差异化战略定义和溢价条件为前提,发现通过Nash均衡解和该约束条件导出从业战略的基本性质的路径,应用于检验Palepu识别假设.初次从数理模型导出几个从业战略的性质定理和Porter-DuPont-Nash战略识别准则.理论推演显示:成本领先战略是内生的;纯成本领先战略的基本特性是具有对纯差异化战略的成本优势,生产率优势和价格优势;纯差异化战略具有单位产品利润优势;而混合战略则具有除价格以外的全部优势.通过数理推演首次给出了Palepu假设与Porter溢价条件不一致的证明.This paper introduces systematic modeling into strategic management research, combines it with the financial analysis of competitive strategies. A Nash equilibrium model is developed based on asymmetric utility functions and the financial parameters of DnPont system. Notably, the model postulates the constraint condition of iso-performent and adopts Michael Porter＇s definition and premium condition of differentiation strategy. Such a model derives basic properties of business strategy in Nash equilibrium solutions. The paper mathematically derives several major theorems of business strategies and Porter- DuPont-Nash identification criteria. The theoretical model proves that： 1） cost leadership strategy is endogenous; 2） the advantage of pure cost leadership strategy resides in cost, productivity, and price, whereas that of pure differentiation strategy resides in unit product profit; 3） combination strategy （i.e. low-cost differentiation） dominates the advantages of both strategies above except for price. These results suggest that Palepu assumptions and porter premium condition are contradictory.

关 键 词：从业战略 博弈论 DuPont体系 Palepu假设 成本领先 差异化 混合战略 Porter溢价条件 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F272