双层委托代理下投资基金参与合作研发对赌协议设计  

Valuation Adjustment Mechanism Design for Cooperative R&D with Venture Capital Based on Double Principal-agent

作　　者：黄波[1] 李宇雨[2] 黄伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学计算机与信息科学学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2015年第4期75-84,共10页R&D Management

基　　金：国家高技术研究发展计划(863计划)"腹胸腔微创手术机器人研发"(2012AA041602);重庆市决策咨询与管理创新计划重点项目"促进研发投入大幅增加的对策研究"(cstc2013jccx B00007);中央高校基本科研业务费项目"基于团队生产理论的产学研合作研发激励机制研究"(106112015CDJXY020006)

摘　　要：通过构建企业、投资基金及科研组织的协同创新博弈模型,研究了企业如何通过对赌协议(亦称估值调整协议)等机制设计,解决合作研发中企业、投资基金及科研组织间的逆向选择问题,同时防范合作过程中的道德风险,并通过案例研究对模型进行了验证.研究表明,企业可在与投资基金的对赌协议中,将其最优市场投资在好市场环境下所获市场收益确定为目标收益,并承诺达不到目标收益就将其足够多份额的股份无偿转让给投资基金,同时,要求投资基金在其达到目标收益时无偿转让相应股份,以此将其与低赢利企业区分开来,促进合作研发达成,并最大化自身利润.It developed a game model of cooperative R＆D among an enterprise, a venture capital and a R＆D organization, in order to study how an enterprise, through designing a valuation adjustment mechanism, solve the adverse selection between an enterprise and a venture capital, as well as between an enterprise and a R＆I） organization, meanwhile prevent moral hazard in cooperative R＆D. Furthermore, it illuminated and testified the mode through case study. It found that, in the valuation adjustment contract, an enterprise can set the market return under its optimal investment and good market environment as the target return, and promise it will freely transfer its certain share to venture capital if it does not achieve the target return, while the venture capital should transfer its certain share to the enterprise if it a- chieves the target return. As a result, it can be distinguished from the enterprises of low profitability, cooperative R＆D is formed, and the enterprise＇s profit is maximized.

关 键 词：合作研发 对赌协议 双层委托代理 逆向选择 投资基金 

分 类 号：F406.3[经济管理—产业经济]