政治联系、资本结构与房地产企业过度投资  

Political Connection,Capital Structure and the Real Estate Enterprises' Over-investment

作　　者：李伟军[1] 李智[2,3] 王敬勇[4] 

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院 [2]江苏三六五网络有限公司 [3]南京大学商学院 [4]南京审计学院会计学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2015年第2期61-73,共13页China Economic Studies

基　　金：2012年国家社科基金青年项目(12CJY018);2012年南京大学研究生科研创新基金项目(2012CW009);江苏省研究生科研创新基金项目(CXLX12-0010);南京大学银兴研究基金项目;2013年第54批博士后面上项目(2013M541628);江苏省博士后项目(1301015C)资助

摘　　要：本文以当前中国房地产市场表现出的产能过剩为研究背景,从政治联系和资本结构角度入手探讨房地产企业过度投资的发生机制。结果发现:政治联系和资本结构是影响房地产企业过度投资的重要因素,并且这些因素的影响因产权性质而异。其中,政治联系显著加剧了国有房地产企业的过度投资,而资本结构则是推动非国有房地产企业过度投资的关键因素。究其原因,国有房地产企业的政治联系更有利于获取政策资源,同时也更易受到政府发展意志的影响;相比较,非国有房地产企业并不具备政策上的比较优势,其投资扩张更多的依赖于资本杠杆驱动。To better understand China＇s excess production capacity of its real estate industry,the study discusses the influence mechanisms of real estate companies＇ over-investment from the perspective of political connection and capital structure.The results show that： Political connections and capital structure are important factors affecting the real estate enterprise＇s over-investment,and the importance of these factors varies depending on the firm＇s ownership type. Specifically,the political connection obviously intensifies state-owned real estate enterprises＇ over-investment,while the capital structure expansion significantly impels the over-investment of non-state-owned real estate enterprises. The investigation shows that,state-owned real estate enterprises have closer political ties,allowing them to take advantage of the policy to promote investment,but meanwhile their investment decisions will also be influenced by the volition of the government. On the contrary,non-state-owned real estate enterprises,which do not have the comparative advantage of policy resources,have to support their investment expansion by adjusting their capital structure.

关 键 词：政治联系 资本结构 房地产企业 过度投资 

分 类 号：D632[政治法律—政治学] F299.23[政治法律—中外政治制度]