我国央行的信息披露度分析——基于全局博弈模型的数值模拟  

Information Disclosure of People's Bank of China:A study based on the numerical simulation of Global Game Model

作　　者：刘剑文[1] 李红昌[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第3期62-69,共8页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：利用一个改进的全局博弈模型,研究央行的信息披露问题,可以为信息披露政策的制定提供理论基础。通过求解博弈模型中信息波动与信息披露度的关系,结合我国的通胀预测信息特征,研究发现:只有在合作关系非常强,而私人信息精确度又较高时,货币当局才有理由使得信息不完全被披露;当信息不必完全公开时,合作关系越弱,则对私人信息精确度的要求也越高;在中国目前私人信息波动较大的前提下,我国央行仍有必要加大信息披露力度。With an improved global game model,this paper studies the information disclosure of People＇s Bank of China（ PBC） to provide a theoretical basis for the establishment of information disclosure policy.Taking into consideration the information characteristics of inflation prediction,the research examines the relationship between the optimal information fluctuation degree and information transparence of the game model.The result shows that：（ 1） PBC has reason to enclose information partly only when the cooperation is very strong and the private information has high precision;（ 2） higher accuracy of private information is required when full disclosure policy is not applied and the cooperation is weak;（ 3） as undulation of private information is significant in China currently,PBC should promote the degree of information disclosure.

关 键 词：信息披露 全局博弈 货币政策 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F832.31