分析师覆盖与真实活动操控——来自中国上市公司的证据  

Analyst Coverage and Real Activities Manipulation:Evidence from China's Listed Firms

作　　者：张芳芳[1] 陈习定[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院,北京100872 [2]温州大学城市学院,浙江温州325035

出　　处：《经济管理》2015年第9期92-102,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目"中国上市公司真实活动操控的理论与实证研究"(13YJC790011);浙江省自然科学基金项目"中国上市公司内部人交易行为研究"(LQ13G030012);浙江省哲学社会科学规划一般项目"中国上市公司近视行为的理论与实证分析"(14NDJC086YB)

摘　　要：本文旨在探讨证券分析师对上市公司尤其是其真实活动操控而言究竟扮演哪种角色,是外部监管者还是过度压力提供者?本文使用2003—2012年之间中国沪深A股上市公司数据,研究证券分析师对上市公司真实活动操控的影响。本文使用多种真实活动操控变量,发现总体上分析师覆盖人数更多的公司的真实活动操控强度更大,即分析师在上市公司真实活动操控过程中主要扮演过度压力提供者的角色。进一步研究发现,向下管理盈余(真实活动操控变量为负)公司的分析师覆盖人数与真实活动操控强度显著正相关,而向上管理盈余(真实活动操控变量为正)公司的分析师覆盖人数与真实活动操控强度显著负相关。这表明,分析师对上市公司真实活动操控的压力作用是由向下管理盈余公司子样本驱动的,对向上管理盈余公司而言,证券分析师是其真实活动操控的外部监管者。本文通过使用工具变量解决潜在内生性问题,发现上述结果是稳健的。Previous studies about security analysts focus more on the impact of analysts on investor decisions and real activities manipulation. Current researchers focus their studies mainly on accrual-based manipulation, while this paper aim to further relevant researches and make clear the effects of analysts on real activities manipulation. According to previous researches, when analysts follow listed firms＇ performance, they may play two different roles, outside regulators and excessive pressure providers. On the one hand, analysts are naturally deemed as outside regulators of listed firms, and in reality, they are initial discovers of a series of financial fraud cases in recent years. On the other hand, analysts often tend to set unachievable high earnings forecast and thus make managers have no alternative but to resort to earnings manipulation, perhaps due to market value management motives. From this point, that under the pressure of analysts forecasts managers make more efforts on ing sharply,can be very well summarized as excessive pressure providers. And then it coverage and earnings management are positively related. earnings to avoid prices fallcan be inferred that analyst Using the data of China Shanghai ＆ Shenzhen A-share listed firms, we study the impact of analyst coverage on real activities manipulation. Different from previous studies, we employ more than one measures of real activities manipulation. We find that analyst coverage is positively related to real activities manipulation; that is to say, analysts mainly play a role of excessive pressure providers. To get a more detailed description, this paper devides firms that manage earnings into two categories, namely upward earnings management （positive real activities manipulation） and downward earnings management （negative real activities manipulation）. Besides, we find that analyst coverage of firms with downward earnings management is positively related to real activities manipulation, while analyst coverage of firms with upward earnin

关 键 词：盈余管理 真实活动操控 分析师覆盖 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]