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出 处:《工业工程》2015年第4期16-21,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(13CJY099);金陵科技学院博士科研启动基金项目(jit-b-201306)
摘 要:构建了一个由经济发达国家和经济欠发达国家的两个厂商组成的双寡头市场中,基于价格(伯川德)竞争的两阶段博弈模型,模型假设产品不仅具有水平差异而且还存在垂直差异,发达国家厂商进行R&D产品投入。研究了以外商直接投资为技术溢出途径时,发展中国家知识产权保护、FDI以及厂商市场绩效的关系。研究表明,基于价格(伯川德)竞争框架,在发达国家厂商的R&D活动具有溢出效应的情况下,发达国家厂商的市场绩效与产品存在差异化的程度大小、发展中国家拥有生产成本优势的程度高低以及发展中国家知识产权保护力度的强弱有关。而发展中国家厂商的市场绩效则总是在发达国家厂商进行FDI时高。Supposing that there are two firms in a duopoly market, one from developed countries and the other from developing countries. A two-stage game model with Bertrand Competition is constructed. The model assumes that the products have not only horizontal differences but also vertical differences. The firm in developed countries manufactures with R&D investment. The relationship between intellectual property protection, FDI (foreign direct investment) and the firm market performance in developing countries is studied, while the foreign direct investment as the way of technology spillover is viewed. Under the Ber- trand Competition framework, the result shows that when the R&D investment of developed countries has a spillover, the firm market performance is related to the degree of product differentiation, the degree of cost advantage and of IPR( intellectual property rights) protection in developing countries. The market perform- ance of the firms in developing countries is always high when those in developed countries have FDI.
关 键 词:R&D产品 伯川德竞争 知识产权保护 外商直接投资(FDI)
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