基于会计稳健性的内部控制政府监管替代效应  

Substitution Effect of Internal Control for Government Regulation Based on Accounting Conservatism

作　　者：赵兴楣[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学工商管理博士后流动站,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《当代财经》2015年第9期119-128,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(09CJY087);国家自然科学基金项目(71172224);广东省自然科学基金项目(10151032001000008);广东商学院博士项目(08BS79001)

摘　　要：内部控制的政府监管用外部契约监管替代内部契约治理,对会计稳健性和其他外部信息监管有替代效应。政府监管有效地减少了投资者对会计稳健性的依赖,因而政府监管公司的会计稳健性明显更低。审计介入缓解了代理冲突和信息需求冲突,强化了监管效应,显著降低了政府监管公司的会计稳健性。国有效应和地区效应对会计稳健性有替代作用,但是内部控制的政府监管减弱了这些效应的影响。To substitute the extemal contractual regulation for the internal contractual governance as the internalcontrolled government regulation will generate substitution effect for accounting conservatism and other external information regulation. The government regulation can effectively reduce the investors＇ dependence on accounting conservatism, thus the accounting conservatism in government-regulated companies is significantly lower. The audit intervention can relieve agency conflicts and information demand conflicts, so the accounting conservatism in the government-regulated companies is significantly lowered. The state effect and regional effect also have substitution effect for accounting conservatism, but the internal-controlled government regulation will weaken the influence of these effects.

关 键 词：内部控制 信息监管 会计稳健性 替代效应 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]