风险投资辛迪加成员背景、组织结构与IPO抑价——基于中国创业板上市公司的经验研究  

Venture capital syndication's member background,organizational structure,and IPO underpricing:An empirical research based on the GEM of China

作　　者：许昊[1] 万迪昉[1] 徐晋[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]麻省理工学院斯隆管理学院,波士顿02139

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第9期2177-2185,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71173166;71373202;71472151);陕西省科技研究发展计划项目(2014KRZ03)

摘　　要：通过手工收集创业板公司风险投资辛迪加数据,本文研究了辛迪加成员背景、内部组织结构与公司IPO抑价间的关系.经验研究发现,辛迪加、主导机构和主导背景的规模均能有效提升公司质量.政府作为主导机构或主导背景均不能改善公司绩效,而外资在这两方面都是有效的投资者.此外,混合背景结构辛迪加比单一背景结构辛迪加对公司的贡献更大.Through manually gathering the data of venture capital syndication in firms listed in the GEM of China, we study the relation between syndication＇s member background, internal organizational structure and firm＇s IPO underpricing. The empirical research shows that syndication scale, leading institution scale, and leading background scale can all effectively enhance firm＇s quality. As a leading institution or a leading background, the government cannot improve firm＇s performance. Foreign venture capital, however, is an effective investor, no matter whether it plays the role of a leading institution or a leading background. What is more, compared with the single background structure syndication, mixed background structure syndication makes more contributions to the firm.

关 键 词：风险投资 辛迪加 背景 首次公开发行(IPO)抑价率 创业板(GEM) 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]