网络外部性下零售商市场策略演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary game analysis of market strategy of retailers under network externality

作　　者：易余胤[1] 张显玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广州510632

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第9期2251-2261,共11页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金(2014A030313391);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(12JNQM002);暨南大学管理学院重点学科建设育题基金(GY14005)

摘　　要：运用演化博弈理论,构建了网络外部性环境下的不对称双群体演化博弈模型,分析了具有有限理性的零售商在长期的市场演化中,会如何选择最适合其生存的市场策略的问题.首先,假设零售商有两种市场策略:数量策略和价格策略,并在网络外部性环境下建立了零售商在不同市场策略下的演化博弈模型.其次,在产品具有替代互补性和网络外部性下讨论了动态系统的稳定性,发现在一定的条件下,价格策略和数量策略均可以成为系统的演化稳定点.再次,分析了网络外部性、产品的替代/互补性和市场规模对演化稳定点的吸引域的影响,发现网络外部性、产品替代/互补性和市场规模的变化均会影响到系统的演化路径.最后,通过数值算例,进一步验证和分析了所取得的理论成果.By using evolutionary game theory, an asymmetric two-population evolutionary game model under the network externality environment is built, and retailers with bounded rationality, in the long- term market competition, how to choose the market strategy which is most suitable for their survival are discussed. Firstly, the evolutionary game models in which retailers can choose sales strategy or price strategy are built. Secondly, by respectively discussing the stability of dynamic system in both cases of manufacturers producing substitutes and complements, it is showed that there are two ESS in the system, both sales strategy and pricing strategy can evolve into stable point when some certain conditions are met. On this basis, the influence of the market scale, the network externality, and the product substitutability or complementary upon the basin of attraction of ESS are analyzed. By the analysis, it is found that the dynamic system will evolve in different directions when the market scale, the network externality and the product of substitutability or complementary character vary. Lastly, through some numerical examples, the theoretical results obtained in this paper are verified.

关 键 词：网络外部性 市场策略 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]