为什么政府机构越来越膨胀？--部门利益分化的视角  

Why Does Government Size Grow? An Organizational Interest Divergence Perspective

作　　者：高楠[1] 梁平汉[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学文澜学院,邮政编码430073 [2]西南财经大学经济与管理研究院,法学院,邮政编码610074

出　　处：《经济研究》2015年第9期30-43,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金2015年青年科学基金项目(71503208);西南财经大学“中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金”;国家留学基金委的资助

摘　　要：已有大量文献基于地方官员的个人特征,如年龄、学历、籍贯、社会联系等角度研究了官员激励对于地方政治经济表现的影响。本文则在此基础上更进一步,把政经决策看作是集体决策原则下地方官员之间的博弈结果。在制度不健全的背景下,地方决策层中基于一定权力结构和利益分化所进行的博弈和权力平衡需要是屡次机构精简改革成效不彰、政府机构规模居高不下的一个重要原因。根据省委常委会组成情况,本文构造了1992—2011年间省级决策层内部门利益分化程度的年度指标。实证结果表明,部门利益分化程度显著增加了高级干部职数。在控制了地方财政结构、产业结构、人口规模、经济增长水平,以及省委书记个人权力等变量后,关于部门利益分化程度和机构规模关系的主要实证结果仍然成立。由此表明,加强制度建设,简政放权,并在决策中实行权责统一是控制政府规模,推行机构改革的必要条件。Based on personal characteristics including ages, education, birth place, connections, etc. , a large body of literature studies the role of local officials＇ career incentive in political and economic performance. We take a further step to consider the policy making as the outcome of the game among local officials under collective leadership principle. We suggest that under certain power structure and weak institutions, this game and the consequent need to balance power within leadership, play an important role in growing government size and previously failed attempts to streamline the staff. Using the manually collected information about the composition of provincial party stand committees, we construct a measure of interest divergence within provincial leadership during 1992--2011. It is demonstrated that the extent of interest divergence significantly increases the size of senior appointees. This result holds after controlling for local fiscal structure, industrial structure, population size, economic growth, and the power of party secretaries, etc.. Therefore, we suggest that deregulation, imposing constraints on executives, and unifying power and responsibilities are key to controlling government size and delivering reforms within public sector.

关 键 词：权力结构 政府规模 利益分化 组织 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]