论警察权力寻租性腐败的产生及其制约  

Emergence and Restriction of Rent- Seeking Corruption:Based on the example of Rent- Seeking Police Power

作　　者：赵敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏警官学院法律系,江苏南京210012

出　　处：《西北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第5期85-92,共8页Journal of Northwest University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：江苏高校优势学科建设工程;江苏警官学院警察法治科研创新团队建设项目(2015SJYTS02);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2012SJB820007)

摘　　要：权力具有公共性,但公权力的运行往往会偏离公共利益这个目标,演变成权力行使主体谋取私利的工具,导致寻租性腐败的产生。按照现代的寻租理论,通过对警察权力1寻租实例的解析发现,只要影响到资源配置的政府干预存在,就会有经济租金的产生;只要有经济租金的存在,权力寻租行为的发生就不可避免。因此,对权力寻租的防治应当从减少不必要的行政干预、引入市场竞争机制、控制租金的产生等方面采取相应的对策。Public power is not exclusive. However, the execution of public power usually departs the goal of public interest, evolves into a tool for self - interest and causes the emergence of rent - seeking corruption. Based on the modem theory of rent - seeking, and through analysis of cases on rent - seeking police power, the result shows： only if the government executes intervention and affects the allocation of resources, can it produce economic rent. Additionally, only with economic rent＇s existence, rent -seeking power can happen. Thus, the governance of power rent - seeking should limits the unnecessary administrative intervention, intro- duces the mechanism of marketing and competition, controls the emergence of rent and adopts corresponding responses in other aspects.

关 键 词：寻租 寻租性腐败 行政干预 权力寻租 

分 类 号：D916.1[政治法律—法学]