中美汇率动态博弈  

Research on the Dynamic Game of Sino-American Exchange Rates

作　　者：林远[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学经济学院金融系,天津300222

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2015年第5期52-58,126,共7页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71173151)的资助

摘　　要：后危机时代,美国为了恢复本国经济,扭转贸易逆差局势,频频向中国施压,要求人民币升值,中国出于可持续发展考虑,需在与美国的汇率博弈中坚持立场,最大化自身效用。结合国内外汇率博弈研究,本文从中美贸易关系和国内经济结构的角度出发,研究中美汇率博弈的路径,以及对两国利益的影响。本文认为:美国和中国之间的贸易结构、贸易依存度、美国对出口部分及进口部分利益的重视程度决定美国是否会选择让人民币升值,但是在不同情境下,触发美国选择人民币升值的条件不同,这与中美报复与反报复程度,中国对进口部门和出口部分利益重视程度相关。in the era of post-financial crisis,America always put pressures on China and requires RMB to appreciate in order to recover its domestic economy and reverse the trade deficit situation. China needs to maximize its own utility in the exchange rate game with America for its sustainable development. This paper starts from the Sino-American trade relationship and domestic economic structure,studies the paths of Sino-American exchange rate game and its effects on the interest of the two countries. This paper thinks: the structure of the trade between China and America,trade dependency and the emphasizing degree of America on export and import determine whether America chooses to let RMB appreciate. But in different conditions,the conditions that trigger America to select RMB's appreciation are different. This is related to the degree of Sino-American retaliation and counter-retaliation and the emphasizing degree of China on the interest of export and import.

关 键 词：人民币汇率 贸易结构 国家利益 博弈策略 

分 类 号：F837.12[经济管理—金融学] F832.6